Why Asia and Europe are responding to the same crisis differently
August 12 2020 01:02 AM
A woman walks across a bridge overlooking the financial business district in Singapore yesterday. Si
A woman walks across a bridge overlooking the financial business district in Singapore yesterday. Singapore’s virus-hammered economy shrank almost 43% in the second quarter, in a sign that the country’s first recession in more than a decade was deeper than initially estimated, official data showed yesterday.

By Khor Ho Ee and Rolf Strauch Singapore/Luxembourg City

Covid-19 has claimed more than 700,000 lives, infected over 19mn people, and decimated rich and poor economies alike. But, even as most of the world faces unprecedented recession, policy responses differ sharply. The contrast between Europe and Asia is a case in point.
Both regions are undoubtedly facing serious economic hardship. The European Commission expects the eurozone economy – which grew by 1.3% in 2019 – to contract by 8.7% this year. In the Asean+3 – the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), plus China, Hong Kong, Japan, and South Korea – GDP growth is expected to plunge to 0% this year, from 4.8% in 2019.
Policymakers in both regions have responded aggressively, with unprecedented monetary and fiscal stimulus, as well as other measures to support the economy. But different economic structures, institutional arrangements, and vulnerabilities mean that the size, content, and distribution of support have been very different.
In the European Union, fiscal rules – particularly the stricture that a budget deficit cannot exceed 3% of GDP – were temporarily suspended, to give countries more space for expansionary fiscal policy. Of course, significant differences in countries’ fiscal and financial space remain, so the size of the stimulus varies widely by country – from about 50% of GDP in Italy to a few percentage points in other countries, like Ireland.
In the Asean+3, the range is narrower, but not by much. Japan’s stimulus is the largest, at 40% of GDP, while the other economies come in at around 10% of GDP. All told, fiscal measures, together with indirect financial measures (such as debt moratoriums), amount to nearly 29% of GDP in the eurozone, and 13% of GDP in the Asean+3.
Differences in the size of the crisis response can be explained partly by the extent to which guarantees have been used to support firms. In the eurozone, discretionary budgetary measures worth 5.3% of GDP are backed by liquidity facilities totalling almost 21% of GDP. Those facilities consist of public guarantee schemes – which channel liquidity through the banking system into the economy.
The Asean+3 economies have pursued discretionary fiscal measures on a similar scale – 5.1% of GDP, on average – but backed by liquidity-support schemes averaging just 5% of GDP (including temporary debt relief and moratoriums). The magnitude of tax and social-contribution deferrals is comparable in the eurozone and the Asean+3.
Both regions have also taken steps to support household income, though here, too, structural differences have translated into contrasting approaches. Eurozone economies have favoured job-retention schemes, via short-time work compensation – partly a reflection of the region’s robust social security systems. In many Asean+3 economies – which despite their economic heterogeneity, tend to have larger informal economies, more flexible labour markets, and weaker social safety nets – direct income-support schemes have proved effective.
Moreover, automatic stabilisers – such as taxation and the extension of unemployment coverage and social benefits – have played a much larger role in the eurozone, where they amount to about 5% of GDP. In most Asean+3 economies, such stabilisers are estimated to total 1.1% of GDP.
Another notable difference is institutional: in Europe, unlike in the Asean+3, existing structures allowed for complementary policy initiatives at the regional level. Even before the EU launched its unprecedented €750bn ($886bn) recovery fund, finance ministers had agreed to three programmes worth a total of €540bn.
First, the European Commission’s Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) can provide up to €100bn of loans under favourable terms to member states. Second, the European Investment Bank is available to support businesses by mobilising up to €200bn. Finally, the European Stability Mechanism’s Pandemic Crisis Support credit line supports spending on health care and preventive measures during the Covid-19 crisis, up to €240bn.
Of course, the eurozone’s integrated structure also creates risks – particularly if the Covid-19 crisis fuels destabilising divergence among member economies. Some eurozone-wide initiatives – including the recovery fund – aim to mitigate this risk.
There are also notable differences in approach on the monetary-policy front. In emerging and developing economies, central banks have focused on cutting policy rates and injecting liquidity. Key measures among Asean+3 economies have included government guarantees on select bank-lending activities, temporary financing lines, and corporate-bond purchases. Moreover, regulatory forbearance encourages well-capitalised banking sectors to provide some relief to borrowers.
By contrast, central banks in advanced economies had little space to lower interest rates, so they have leaned heavily on quantitative easing. The European Central Bank expanded its €120bn asset-purchase program and created a new temporary €750bn Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme, which it subsequently increased by €600bn.
The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the way structural differences, institutional frameworks, and the extent to which governments and financial systems have built up buffers shape crisis responses. But short-term emergency action is just the beginning.
It is impossible to say how the Covid-19 crisis will unfold. New waves of infection may necessitate renewed lockdowns, impede or even reverse economic recovery, and intensify fiscal pressures. Additional stimulus measures may be needed.
Even if the virus is brought under control relatively quickly, the road to recovery will be long. In Europe and Asia alike, policymakers must begin considering how to translate emergency measures into more sustainable policies. Their approaches may not be the same, but their objectives – safeguarding their economies’ long-term prospects – should be. - Project Syndicate

*Hoe Ee Khor is Chief Economist at the Asean+3 Macroeconomic Research Office.
*Rolf Strauch is Chief Economist at the European Stability Mechanism.

There are no comments.

LEAVE A COMMENT Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked*